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CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION LIABILITY: "THERE
OUGHTA BE A LAW"
INTRODUCTION
The California Court of Appeal for the First District re-
cently decided Collins v. City & County of San Francisco.' In
1968 Collins was arrested for unlawful assembly. Two misde-
meanor courts were dismissed, but Collins was found guilty of
a remaining charge, fined and given a suspended sentence.'
Dissatisfied, the arresting officer swore out a more factually
detailed complaint; an arrest warrant was issued and placed in
the warrant files, even though the dismissal of the two misde-
meanor charges operated as a bar to any other prosecution for
the same offenses.3 About a year later, Collins was arrested on
the warrant and held in custody overnight before the charges
were dismissed three days later.'
Collins brought suit against the City and County of San
Francisco for false arrest on the theory that the city was liable
for the officer's improper filing of the second complaint. The
trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of
the defendant.' The court of appeal affirmed after recharacteri-
zing the action as one for malicious prosecution rather than
false arrest. This was significant because under California law
both the city and the officer are immune from liability for
malicious prosecution, but not for false arrest.'
This comment discusses the policy, illustrated by Collins,
of shielding governmental entities from liability for malicious
prosecution. The tort of malicious prosecution is defined and
outlined. Because false imprisonment and false arrest are
sometimes confused with malicious prosecution, they are
briefly contrasted.
The comment then reviews the major California cases and
the pertinent provisions of the California 1963 Tort Claims
Act,7 which codified the law in this area. Finally, this comment
criticizes the foundations of governmental immunity from ma-
1. 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 123 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1975).
2. Id. at 675, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1387 (West 1970). This section does not apply to felonies.
4. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 675, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
5. Id. at 673, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
6. Id. at 679, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
7. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 810 et seq. (West 1966).
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licious prosecution liability, noting the position of other com-
mentators and the California Law Revision Commission. The
comment concludes by pointing to the need to create some type
of remedy for those who have been prosecuted without basis by
a government entity or official.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Malicious prosecution is defined as an action "for recovery
of damages which have proximately resulted to person, prop-
erty, or reputation from a previous unsuccessful civil or crimi-
nal proceeding, which was prosecuted without probable cause
and with malice." 8 A California statute provides that such an
initiation of criminal proceedings is a misdemeanor
The tort exists where the following elements are shown: 1)
initiation of judicial proceedings 0 against the present plaintiff
by the present defendant;" 2) the bona fide termination of such
proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff; 3) the absence of
probable cause for the institution of such proceeding; 4) the
presence of malice in the institution of such proceeding; and 5)
8. 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 1 (1948). The tort of malicious prosecution
of criminal proceedings occurs "when one citizen initiates or procures the initiation of
criminal proceedings against an innocent person, for an improper purpose and without
probable cause therefore, if the proceeding terminate favorably for the person thus
prosecuted." 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 300 (1956).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 170 (West 1970).
10. In the past, the prior proceeding had to be a judicial proceeding, however this
was changed by case law to allow an action for malicious prosecution to be founded
on the institution of proceedings before an administrative agency. Hardy v. Vial, 48
Cal. 2d 577, 581, 311 P.2d 494, 496 (1957), overruling Hayashida v. Kakimoto, 132 Cal.
App. 743, 23 P.2d 311 (1933), and Lorber v. Storrow, 22 Cal. App. 2d 25, 70 P.2d 513
(1937). See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2536 (8th ed. 1974); 31
S. CAL. L. REv. 105 (1957).
11. To be the legal cause of a malicious prosecution it is not necessary that the
defendant be the one who personally signed a complaint or affidavit. It is enough that
the defendant was instrumental in setting the law in motion. Sandoval v. Southern
Cal. Enterprises, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 240, 248, 219 P.2d 928, 934 (1950). A defendant
is not deemed to be the legal cause if, acting in good faith, he simply states the true
facts to the authorities, leaving to them such action as they deem proper. Gogue v.
MacDonald, 35 Cal. 2d 482, 487, 218 P.2d 542, 545 (1950)(defendant complained that
plaintiff tenant had moved without paying). As a defense the defendant may assert
that he acted on the advice of an attorney, however this defense will not be good unless
he made a full and complete disclosure of facts to the attorney. If a full disclosure of
the facts is not made the court may find, by implication, malice and want of probable
cause. Schubkegel v. Gordino, 56 Cal. App. 2d 667,671-72, 133 P.2d 475, 478-79 (1943).
In actions concerning private parties there can be respondeat superior liability for
the acts of agents. Such liability, even to the extent of punitive damages, may be
imposed even if the corporation merely impliedly ratifies the wrongful acts of its agents
by not firing them after the event. Sandoval v. Southern Cal. Enterprises, Inc., 98 Cal.
App. 2d at 250, 219 P.2d at 936 (1950).
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damage to the plaintiff from the proceeding."1 California litiga-
tion in the area has focused on the elements of favorable termi-
nation, want of probable cause and malice. 3
Malice and Want of Probable Cause
The closely related requirements of malice and want of
probable cause are the basic elements of an action for malicious
prosecution. Malice may be inferred from the lack of probable
cause, but want of probable cause may not be inferred from
malice." In order to find malice it is not necessary to show that
the prosecution was inspired by actual hostility or feelings of
ill will toward the plaintiff." What is required is evidence
which establishes "bad faith," or the lack of a sincere belief
that the prosecution was justified by the facts.'" Malice may be
found where the primary purpose of the defendant was some-
thing other than the bringing of an offender to justice. 7
The plaintiff also has the burden of showing want of proba-
ble cause.' In determining whether there was probable cause
for the institution of the prior proceedings the question is not
whether the plaintiff was guilty or civilly liable, but whether
the defendant had probable cause to believe he was guilty.'
When the original action was criminal in nature, the exist-
ence of probable cause is not refuted by a showing that no
crime was committed or that the accused was innocent,"0 but
a judgment against the present plaintiff, unless procured by
fraud, is conclusive proof that the proceedings were prosecuted
with probable cause, even though that judgment is reversed on
appeal.'
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 883 (1941).
13. See, e.g. Siffert v. McDowell, 103 Cal. App. 2d 373, 376, 229 P.2d 388, 390
(1951).
14. Centers v. Dollar Mkts., 99 Cal. App. 2d 534, 542, 222 P.2d 136, 142 (1950).
15. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 383, 295 P.2d 405, 410 (1956).
16. Singleton v. Singleton, 68 Cal. App. 2d 681, 696, 157 P.2d 886, 894 (1945)
(grand theft complaint signed by plaintiffs brother).
17. Bulkley v. Klien, 206 Cal. App. 2d 742, 750, 23 Cal. Rptr. 855, 859 (1962)
(defendant charged plaintiff with theft out of personal animosity).
18. Haydel v. Morton, 8 Cal. App. 2d 730, 732, 48 P.2d 709, 710 (1935).
19. White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 312-13, 73 P.2d 254, 256 (1937).
20. Haydel v. Morton, 8 Cal. App. 2d 730, 733, 48 P.2d 709, 710 (1935).
21. Norton v. John M.C. Marble Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 451, 454, 86 P.2d 892, 894
(1939). However, the fact that the present plaintiff won in the previous proceeding does
not negative the existence of probable cause. Sebastian v. Crowley, 38 Cal. App. 2d
194, 203, 101 P.2d 120, 124 (1940) (probable cause existed to believe plaintiff actress
was involved in scheme to defraud hotel owner by not paying bill).
1977]
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Termination of the Prior Proceeding
The rule that the prior proceeding must be favorably ter-
minated is strictly applied in California. The rule prevents
inconsistent judgments and makes the determination of the
existence of probable cause and malice easier because of the
presumptions which flow from a favorable termination.22 The
question of what is meant by a favorable termination has been
addressed in several cases. Termination does not mean that
there must be a determination on the merits,23 or that the pro-
ceedings are incapable of revival. 4 It is only necessary to show
that in order to proceed further, the prosecutor or civil litigant
would have to institute proceedings de novo.25 A termination of
the proceeding on technical or procedural grounds not incon-
sistent with the party's culpability does not constitute a favora-
ble termination," although a voluntary dismissal is considered
a favorable termination which will support an action for mali-
cious prosecution.27
Malicious Prosecution Distinguished from False Arrest and
False Imprisonment
As can be seen from the Collins case, the distinction be-
tween an action for false arrest or false imprisonment and mali-
cious prosecution is important primarily because of the govern-
mental immunity which attaches to malicious prosecution ac-
tions.
California defines false imprisonment by statute as "the
unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another. '28 The
restraint of liberty need not be accomplished by active force.
"A person is falsely imprisoned if he is wrongfully deprived of
his freedom to leave a particular place by the conduct of an-
22. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971).
But see Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967). For a
discussion of the problems which may be involved where the termination rule is not
followed, see Note, Counterclaim for Malicious Prosecution in the Action Alleged to
be Malicious, 58 YALE L.J. 490 (1949).
23. Hurgren v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 141 Cal. 585, 587, 75 P. 168, 169
(1904).
24. MacDonald v. Joslyn, 275 Cal. App. 2d 282, 289, 79 Cal. Rptr. 707, 711 (1969)
(action for malicious prosecution of will contest).
25. Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 157, 114 P.2d 335, 341 (1941) (grand theft
proceedings against plaintiff dismissed).
26. Id. at 150, 114 P.2d at 338.
27. MacDonald v. Joslyn, 275 Cal. App. 2d at 289, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236 (West 1970).
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other .... Words or conduct furnishing a reasonable appre-
hension on the part of the one restrained that he will not be
allowed to depart is sufficient."29 Usually false imprisonment
and false arrest are discussed as if they were the same, and for
most purposes no distinction need be drawn-although there
are situations where the false "imprisonment" does not origi-
nate with a false "arrest," but exists independently because of
delay in taking a person before a magistrate," or failing to
release after bail has been delivered. 31
Stated simply, the distinction between malicious prosecu-
tion and false imprisonment is that in malicious prosecution
the detention is malicious, but under due forms of law, whereas
in false imprisonment the detention is without color of legal
authority.2 If the plaintiff was
29. Schanafelt v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 420, 422-23, 239 P.2d 42,
43 (1951).
30. Williams v. Zelzah Warehouse Co., 126 Cal. App. 28, 14 P.2d 177 (1932).
31. Shakespeare v. City of Pasadena, 230 Cal. App. 2d 375, 386, 40 Cal. Rptr.
863, 870 (1964). Although many false imprisonment cases arise out of warrantless
arrests, they occur even where a warrant was issued. California still adheres to the rule
of an old case which held that even if an arrest warrant is issued, where the charge
does not constitute a crime, the remedy is an action for false imprisonment, not
malicious prosecution. Krause v. Spiegel, 94 Cal. 370, 373, 29 P. 707, 708 (1892) (defen-
dant caused issuance of arrest warrant for slander). See also 4 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAw 2523-24 (8th ed. 1974). In addition, an officer may be liable for false
arrest or imprisonment if the warrant is void or invalid on its face. CAL. CIv. CODE §
43.5(a) (West 1954); Muller v. Reagh, 215 Cal. App. 2d 831, 837, 30 Cal. Rptr. 633,
637 (1963). Whether or not the warrant is valid on its face is not determined on the
basis of scrutiny by a trained legal mind. The officer has a duty to execute the warrant
unless it is patently irregular or void. Collins v. City & County of San Francisco, 60
Cal. App. 3d 671, 677, 123 Cal. Rptr. 525, 528-29 (1975).
For a full discussion of the "valid on its face" warrant requirement see 57 Op. CAL.
ATr'y GEN. 542 (1974). See also Vallindras v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 42
Cal. 2d 149, 154, 265 P.2d 907, 910-11 (1954), wherein the court stated that "all that
is required to make process fair on its face is that it must proceed from a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and that it contain nothing which ought reasonably
to appraise the officer that it was issued without authority." An officer may still be
liable for false imprisonment even with a valid warrant if he carelessly arrests the
wrong party by failing to take reasonable precautions to ascertain that the person
arrested is the party against whom the warrant was issued. Smith v. Madruga, 193 Cal.
App. 2d 543, 546-47, 14 Cal. Rptr. 389, 390 (1961). But an officer will be shielded from
liability if the arrest was made by a private citizen who delivered the party to the
officer, in which case the remedy is against the private citizen. CAL. PENAL CODE § 847
(West 1970); Kinney v. County of Contra Costa, 8 Cal. App. 3d 761, 87 Cal. Rptr. 638
(1970). If an action for false imprisonment is alleged on the basis of an arrest made
without a warrant, it is also necessary to allege lack of probable cause. Wilson v.
County of Los Angeles, 21 Cal. App. 3d 308, 315, 98 Cal. Rptr. 525, 530 (1971).
32. Collins v. City & County of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 676, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 525, 528 (1975).
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arrested or confined without a warrant... malicious prose-
cution will not lie, since the essence of that tort is the
perversion of proper legal procedure, and the remedy is
false imprisonment. On the other hand, if there is a valid
process or due authority apart from it, the arrest is not
"false" and the action must be one of malicious prosecu-
tion."
The two actions, therefore, are said to be inconsistent.
An action for false arrest or false imprisonment is based on
the illegality of the arrest or detention. As nothing done after
the illegal act can "legalize" it, there is no requirement that a
prior proceeding be "terminated" as there is in an action for
malicious prosecution." Similarly, provocation, motive and
good faith are not elements of an action for false arrest unless
punitive or exemplary damages are sought.35 But as in actions
for malicious prosecution, the defendant must have taken some
active part in bringing about the unlawful arrest. He is not
liable if, acting in good faith, he merely gives information to
the authorities.36
Application of the principles to the facts in the Collins case
reaffirms the court's recharacterization of the action. In Collins
the officer made the arrest pursuant to a warrant which was
valid on its face. It was the filing of the warrant in the first
place which was improper, and the remedy for this "perversion
of proper legal procedure" is an action for malicious prosecu-
tion. The officer who swore out the complaint "instituted" the
proceeding against Collins, which "terminated" in his favor
with the dismissal of charges. Though it appears there was
"probable cause" to believe that Collins committed the of-
fense, the presence of "malice" and "damages" would also
have to be established.
Despite the legal orthodoxy of the relabelling by the court,
33. Id. at 677, 123 Cal Rptr at 528, citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 646 (2d ed. 1955). Another distinction between the two actions is that for false
imprisonment the early remedy was an action for trespass, since that tort was consid-
ered a direct interference with the plaintiff's person. The remedy for malicious prosecu-
tion was an action on the case because that tort was regarded as more indirect. Id. at
676-77, .123 Cal. Rptr. at 528, citing W. PROSSER, supra, at 53. An action on the case
was a common law personal action which was for the recovery of damages for torts not
committed with force, or, if force was used, the injury was not immediate, but conse-
quential. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 51 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
34. Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal. 2d 489, 495, 289 P.2d 794, 798 (1955).
35. Id. at 494, 289 P.2d at 798.
36. Wilson v. County of Los Angeles, 21 Cal App. 3d 308, 317, 98 Cal. Rptr. 525,
530 (1971). See note 11 supra.
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it prevented Mr. Collins from proving any of these elements,
and barred him from any remedy whatsoever because the mu-
nicipality and its employees are immune from malicious prose-
cution liability.
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
,Governmental tort liability in California is regulated by
statute.37 However, as background to the growth of judicial
thought in the malicious prosecution cases, one particular con-
cept of general governmental immunity should be briefly re-
viewed. 8
Governmental tort liability has sometimes turned on a dis-
tinction made between acts of municipal employees which are
ministerial in nature and those that were discretionary in na-
ture. If an act was ministerial, that is, mandatory in certain
situations, then the failure to perform the act as required could
give rise to employee tort liability." However, an employee
would be immune from liability for acts performed within his
discretion,'" such as the decision whether or not to institute
criminal proceedings. This distinction often appeared in mali-
cious prosecution cases and the distinction is retained in the
California Government Code."
The basic shield to malicious prosecution liability had its
37. See text accompanying notes 99-104 infra.
38. Early cases in the area of malicious prosecution were concerned with the
individual's liability as a public employee because the government entity itself was
generally protected by concepts of sovereign immunity, although certain distinctions
were often made. For example, municipal liability was often determined on the basis
of whether a proprietary or governmental function was involved. A municipality was
immune from liability for torts arising from its governmental functions, such as police
or fire protection, but could be liable for torts arising from the exercise of its proprie-
tary functions, such as the maintenance of public property. Fuller & Casner, Municipal
Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAnv. L. REv. 437, 441-44 (1941). For application of
the governmental-proprietary function distinction in California see People v. Superior
Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947); Oppenheimer v. City of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.
App. 2d 545, 232 P.2d 26 (1951); Norton v. Hoffman, 34 Cal. App. 2d 189, 93 P.2d 250
(1939).
Later cases still focused on the individual employee's liability, and it is reflected
in the structure of the Government Code. If a government employee is immune from
liability his government employer cannot be liable. See text accomanying notes 101-
04, 111, 119, 124 infra.
39. Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94, 96 (1856).
40. Id. See also Oppenheimer v. Arnold, 99 Cal. App. 2d 872, 222 P.2d 940 (1950);
Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. Rav. 263 (1937); Com-
ment, Discretionary Immunity in California in the Aftermath of Johnson v. State, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 454 (1975).
41. See text accompanying note 101 infra.
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origins in the concept of "quasi-judicial" immunity. In Califor-
nia the principal that a judicial officer is not liable for acts done
in his official capacity and within his jurisdiction was well
established at an early date.42 The rationale for this policy is
that judges need such protection in order to function indepen-
dently and without fear of liability.43 This policy was extended
to include those whose duties were "quasi-judicial."44 In the
1856 case of Downer v. Lent 5 the California Supreme Court
held that the Board of Pilot Commissioners, which had revoked
the license of a San Francisco port pilot, exercised a quasi-
judicial power, and public policy required that it be allowed to
exercise its judgment and discretion without being civilly lia-
ble." The court distinguished the discretionary action taken by
the Board from actions which were ministerial in nature, stat-
ing that a ministerial officer who fails to execute his well-
defined duties does so at his peril, but that an officer entrusted
with duties which require the exercise of judgment should be
protected from any consequences of error.47
Quasi-judicial immunity has been extended in malicious
prosecution cases to grand jurors,4" public prosecutors, 9 build-
ing inspectors,50 and other public officials. 5 The policy behind
this extension was explained in 1935 by the court of appeal in
Pearson v. Reed:
The doctrine of immunity is not for the benefit of the few
who might otherwise be compelled to respond in damages.
It is for the benefit of all to whom it applies, that they may
be free to act in the exercise of honest judgment, uninflu-
enced by fear of consequences personal to themselves. This
again is not for their personal advantage or benefit. It is
42. Going v. Dinwiddie, 86 Cal. 633, 637, 25 P. 129, 129 (1890).
43. Put another way, if there were not such an immunity, "no man but a beggar,
or a fool, would be a judge." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 241
(1965) quoting Miller v. Hope, 2 Shaw H.L. 125, 134 (Scot., 1824) [hereinafter cited
as JAFFE].
44. Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880).
45. 6 Cal. 94 (1856).
46. Id. at 96.
47. Id.
48. Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 67 (1880).
49. Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 44 P.2d 592 (1935).
50. Dawson v. Martin, 150 Cal. App. 2d 379, 309 P.2d 915 (1957); White v.
Brinkman, 23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 73 P.2d 254 (1937).
51. White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951) (State Fish and Game
Commission investigator).
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only that they be enabled to render a better public serv-
ice.5"
In 1942 the court of appeal in Prentice v. Bertken 3 tempo-
rarily limited this extension. The court recognized that it was
settled public policy to protect judicial and quasi-judicial offi-
cers acting within the scope of their jurisdiction from malicious
prosecution liability, even though the officer had acted without
probable cause and with malice.54 But the court believed that
public policy did not require that the exemption be extended
to peace officers who maliciously and without probable cause
initiated a prosecution against a citizen, stating that "the
briefest reflection will lead one to conclude that to do so might
be dangerous to the rights of a free people and lead to great
oppression and injustice."55 This reasoning and this language
was disapproved nine years later by the California Supreme
Court in White v. Towers 6
The Major California Cases Confirming Immunity
The major cases in the area of immunity for public officials
from malicious prosecution liability were decided by the Cali-
52. 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 288, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (1935).
53. 50 Cal. App. 2d 344, 123 P.2d 96 (1942).
54. Id. at 350, 123 P.2d at 99.
55. Id.
56. 37 Cal. 2d 727, 732, 235 P.2d 209, 212 (1951). Another obstacle to malicious
prosecution actions had been the argument that actions for malicious prosecution "are
not favored in the law." Sebastian v. Crowley, 38 Cal. App. 2d 194, 202, 101 P.2d 120,
124 (1940). This expression was explained by the California Supreme Court in the 1941
case of Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 114 P.2d 335 (1941):
The frequency with which this statement is made in these cases calls
attention to the need of some explanation. Properly applied, it means
that public policy is in favor of the apprehension and punishment of
criminals, and limits the person complaining of criminal charges by plac-
ing upon him the burden of proving the basic elements of the tort. ...
But where the difficult burden of proof is met by the plaintiff, recovery
is allowed. This being true, we should not be led so astray by the notion
of a "disfavored" action as to defeat the established rights of the plaintiff
by indirection; for example, by inventing new limitations on the substan-
tive right, which are without support in principle or authority ....
Id. at 159, 114 P.2d at 342.
Later decisions pointed to this language when the issue arose, which it often did
because defendants would attempt to use the expression "not favored at law" as the
basis of an affirmative defense against plaintiffs suing them for malicious prosecution.
Siffert v. McDowell, 103 Cal. App. 2d 373, 229 P.2d 388 (1951); Singleton v. Singleton,
68 Cal. App. 2d 681, 157 P.2d 886 (1945). The "not favored at law" statement is still
being repeated in cases as an expression by the courts that they do not want such
actions to be used as harassing devices. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847,
479 P.2d 379, 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182 (1971).
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fornia Supreme Court in the 1950's. The first of these was the
1951 case of White v. Towers. 7 In White, the plaintiff had been
acquitted in two separate proceedings of polluting waters. He
brought an action for malicious prosecution against the investi-
gator for the State Fish and Game Commission who had insti-
tuted the prosecutions against him.5" A demurrer without leave
to amend was affirmed.59 The court believed that "sound rea-
sons of public policy require that a peace officer, or other com-
parable official, be shielded by the cloak of immunity from civil
liability for alleged malicious prosecution" 0 when acting
within the scope of his authority. The contrary language of
Prentice v. Bertken was disapproved." The court stated that
"[blecause of their tendency to obstruct the administration of
justice, it is the policy of the law to discourage actions for
malicious prosecution.""2 The court answered the argument
that such an extension of immunity was a step toward
"statism" or a "police state" by pointing out that the individ-
ual was protected by the penal statute which made malicious
prosecution a misdemeanor," and that officials who failed to
conduct themselves properly could be ousted from office. 4
Three justices dissented, including the late Justice Carter,
who argued that the injured party had been denied his day in
court;" that the holding was a step toward statism;6 and that
the privilege of immunity should not have been extended to a
person whose duties, power and authority were undefined.67
Coverstone v. Davies's was decided by the California Su-
preme Court in 1952. The court applied the principle an-
nounced in White v. Towers and stated that no cause of action
could be sustained against a deputy sheriff and his captain for
malicious prosecution, on the basis that they were acting
within the scope of their authority in instituting the criminal
57. 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951).
58. Id. at 728-29, 235 P.2d at 210.
59. Id. at 734, 235 P.2d at 214.
60. Id. at 729, 235 P.2d at 211.
61. Id. at 732, 235 P.2d at 212.
62. 37 Cal. 2d at 730, 235 P.2d at 211, quoting Watts v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 641,
669, 228 P. 135 (1924).
63. 37 Cal. 2d at 733, 235 P.2d at 213, citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 170 (West 1970).
64. 37 Cal. 2d at 730, 235 P.2d at 211.
65. Id. at 737, 235 P.2d at 215 (dissenting opinion).
66. Id. at 738, 235 P.2d at 216 (dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 735, 235 P.2d at 214 (dissenting opinion).
68. 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952).
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proceedings. 9 Justice Carter dissented from the affirmance of
a judgment of nonsuit.70 He wrote that there was some evidence
of lack of probable cause and that the majority opinion was
"another step in support of the police state philosophy." 7'
A false imprisonment case, Miller v. Glass," came before
the California Supreme Court in 1955. Law enforcement offi-
cers of the California Department of Fish and Game had ar-
rested the plaintiff for a misdemeanor not committed within
their presence.7 3 The court reversed a summary judgment for
the defendants,"4 stating that "[d]ifferent principles govern
actions for false arrest and imprisonment, for the law expressly
limits the arresting officer's authority." 5 Granting immunity
from liability for arrests made without a warrant for misde-
meanors not committed in the officer's presence would violate
Penal Code section 836, which sets out the conditions under
which an officer may make an arrest without a warrant.76 Jus-
tice Carter concurred in the result, but restated his disagree-
ment with White v. Towers and Coverstone v. Davies."
Although these cases focused on the liability of individu-
als, it should be remembered that the governmental entity
employing them enjoyed absolute immunity from suits for ma-
licious prosecution. This was tersely restated in the 1957 deci-
sion of the Third District Court of Appeal in Dawson v.
Martin.7" In that case the plaintiff brought suit against a
county building inspector for swearing out a complaint falsely
charging violations of the building code.7" The court held that
69. Id. at 322, 239 P.2d at 880.
70. Id. at 324, 239 P.2d at 881.
71. Id. at 327, 239 P.2d at 883 (dissenting opinion).
72. 44 Cal. 2d 359, 282 P.2d 501 (1955).
73. Id. at 361, ,282 P.2d at 502 (refusing to exhibit upon demand a California
fishing license).
74. Id. at 363, 282 P.2d at 504.
75. Id. at 362, 282 P.2d at 503.
76. Id. at 363, 282 P.2d at 504. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1970) provides that
an officer may make an arrest without a warrant:
1. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence.
2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in
his presence.
3. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has in fact
been committed.
77. 44 Cal. 2d at 363, 282 P.2d at 504.
78. 150 Cal. App. 2d 379, 309 P.2d 915 (1957).
79. Id. at 381, 309 P.2d at 916.
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the county enjoyed absolute immunity from malicious prosecu-
tion suits, citing an earlier case which made the governmental
function-proprietary function distinction.o The court also held
that the building inspector was immune from liability because
he was acting under direction of the county board of supervi-
sors and only carrying out his duty."1
The California Supreme Court further extended the con-
cept of immunity in 1957 in the case of Hardy v. Vial."2 The
plaintiff was a state college professor who was accused of un-
professional conduct and dismissed. He brought an action for
malicious prosecution against college and Department of Edu-
cation officials." Hardy did away with the prior judicial pro-
ceeding requirement and stated that an action for malicious
prosecution could be founded on the institution of prior pro-
ceedings before an administrative agency.84 The court stated
that the rule of absolute immunity, notwithstanding malice or
other sinister motive, was not restricted to public officers who
instituted criminal actions, but extended to all executive pub-
lic officers when performing, within the scope of their author-
ity, acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment. 5
The court quoted from a Learned Hand opinion which stated
that the justification for denying recovery, even when an offi-
cial used his power for personal wrongful motive, is that it is
impossible to know whether a claim is well founded until the
case has been tried, and that to allow all officials to be brought
to trial for their decisions would be equally impossible. 87
The Hardy court also held that the power of dismissal was
within the school officer's authority and that the policy on
which the rule of immunity was based "would be defeated if it
were held that whenever an officer uses his office for a personal
motive not connected with the public good he acts outside his
80. Id. at 381-82, 309 P.2d at 917, citing Norton v. Hoffman, 34 Cal. App. 2d 189,
93 P.2d 250 (1939). See note 38 supra.
81. 150 Cal. App. 2d at 382, 309 P.2d at 917 (the supervisors were held to be
immune on the basis of statutory construction). A petition for hearing by the Supreme
Court was denied, although Justice Carter was of the opinion that it should have been
granted. Id. at 385, 309 P.2d at 919.
82. 48 Cal. 2d 577, 311 P.2d 494 (1957).
83. Id. at 579, 311 P.2d at 495.
84. Id. at 581, 311 P.2d at 496. See note 10 supra.
85. 48 Cal. 2d at 582, 311 P.2d at 496.
86. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). See text accompanying
note 138 infra.
87. 48 Cal. 2d at 582-83, 311 P.2d at 496-97.
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power." '" The court held that the immunity protected the offi-
cial even if he acts with others who are not immune. 9 The court
stated, however, that a cause of action existed against the pri-
vate defendant who participated in making the charges. 0
In his dissent, Justice Carter charged that the court in the
earlier cases "had not reached the peak of injustice that it has
reached in the case at bar."'" He further stated that "the entire
doctrine of governmental immunity rests upon a rotten founda-
tion, and ...it should be placed in the judicial garbage can
where it belongs. '92
Commentators were also critical of the Hardy opinion. One
writer was disappointed with the court for not limiting the
extension of the immunity doctrine, particularly in a situation
where an official acted in concert with outsiders. 3 Another
noted that California was the only state extending malicious
prosecution immunity to administrative officers, although this
was also the federal approach, and argued that old common law
ideas of immunity were inadequate to meet the needs of a
society where a large percentage of the population works for the
state and where state activities predominate. 4
In 1961 the California Supreme Court decided Muskopf v.
Corning Hospital District, which purported to hold that "the
rule of governmental immunity from tort liability . . .must
be discarded as mistaken and unjust.""5 The court expressly
declined to extend the effect of its holding to abolish the set-
tled rules of immunity for government officials acting within
the scope of their authority. The court cited Downer v. Lent
to support the rule of non-liability for the consequences of
discretionary acts,97 and White v. Towers, Coverstone v.
Davies, and Hardy v. Vial to support the rule of non-liability
even when the officials have allegedly acted with malice.
88. Id. at 583, 311 P.2d at 497.
89. Id. at 584, 311 P.2d at 497.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 586, 311 P.2d at 499 (dissenting opinion).
92. Id. at 587, 311 P.2d at 499 (dissenting opinion).
93. Note, Are Public Officials Who Conspire with Outsiders Acting Within the
Scope of Thier Authority?, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 81, 83-85 (1957).
94. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 303 (1959).
95. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213, 359 P.2d 457, 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 (1961).
96. Id. at 220, 359 P.2d at 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
97. Id.
98. Id. In support of the continuation of this policy the court repeated the lan-
guage of Learned Hand which had been quoted in the Hardy case. See text accompany-
ing note 138 infra.
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Whatever effect the Muskopf decision had on other types of
tort actions against government entities, it did not change the
rules regarding malicious prosecution actions. That position
was reinforced by the California legislature when it reacted to
the Muskopf decision.
Codification of Immunity
The legislature responded to the Muskopf decision by en-
acting Civil Code section 22.3. This section read in pertinent
part:
The doctrine of governmental immunity from tort lia-
bility is hereby reenacted as a rule of decision in the courts
of this State, and shall be applicable to all matters and all
governmental entities in the same manner and to the same
extent that it was applied in this State on January 1,
1961."1
The section contained a built in expiration clause providing
that it would remain in effect until the ninety-first day after
the final adjournment of the 1963 regular session of the legisla-
ture. 10
Before the expiration of this moratorium statute the Cali-
fornia legislature enacted those sections of the Government
Code known as the Tort Claims act of 1963.101 Section 815(a)
provides that, except as otherwise provided by statute, a public
entity is not liable for any injury arising out of an act or omis-
sion of the entity, its employee, or any other person. Therefore,
if liability is to be found, a statute must be found to support
it. Section 815.2 provides that the entity is liable for the acts
of its employees performed within the scope of their employ-
ment if the employees could be held liable. Section 820.2 codi-
fies the discretionary acts immunity rule, "whether or not such
discretion be abused." Section 820.4 provides that a public
employee is not liable for any act or omission in the execution
or enforcement of any law, as long as he exercises due care. The
section does state however that "[n]othing in this section ex-
99. CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.3 (West Supp. 1976).
100. Id. During the period of this moratorium statute one court stated simply
that no cause of action for malicious prosecution could be stated against the defendant
county. Prieth v. Dorsey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 468, 27 Cal. Rptr. 476, 477 (1962).
101. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 810 et seq. (West 1966). For a good overview of the 1963
Tort Claims Act, see 5 SANTA CLARA LAW. 81 (1964).
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onerates a public employee from liability for false arrest or false
imprisonment."'12
Immunity from malicious prosecution actions was pre-
gerved in section 821.6. That section provides that: "A public
employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or
prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within
the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and
without probable cause."'' 3
This section continues the existing immunity of public
employees, and "because no statute imposes liability on public
entities for malicious prosecution, public entities likewise are
immune from liability. ''1 °0
In 1964 the Second District Court of Appeal applied the
new statutes in an action for false arrest, false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution.' 5 The plaintiff had been arrested
102. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.4 (West 1966).
103. Id. § 821.6.
104. Id. (Legislative Committee Comment). In his work on California Govern-
ment Tort Liability, Professor Van Alstyne, who served as consultant to the California
Law Revision Commission, stated that the extent to which state tort immunity stat-
utes would apply in Federal Civil Rights Act cases was unclear. A. VAN ALSTYNE,
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY § 5.64 (1964). However, he did cite a Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals case, Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963), which appliedjudicial immunity and quasi-judicial immunity for the prosecuting attorney in an
action arising under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970). In 1967 the
United States Supreme Court stated that the well established common law immunity
of judges was not affected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
The Supreme Court of the United States has just recently handed down the
decision of Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), which reaffirms the rule of
absolute immunity protecting a public prosecutor from damage suits. The plaintiff in
Imbler charged the prosecutor with withholding evidence at his earlier trial and filed
a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for loss of liberty. The Court reviewed the
common law rule of quasi-judicial immunity and found it applicable to the action
brought under the civil rights statute. Reviewing the question of public policy involved,
the Court quoted the language of Learned Hand from the case of Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir. 1949) (see text accompanying note 138 infra), and concluded
that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor was
immune from a civil suit for damages under section 1983. Mr. Justice White wrote a
concurring opinion wherein he disagreed with the implication that the settled immun-
ity extended to situations involving violations of constitutional rights. 424 U.S. at 433.
Although the case arose in California, the Court did not discuss the California immun-
ity statutes because the suit had been filed as a federal civil rights action and not as a
malicious prosecution action.
105. Shakespeare v. City of Pasadena, 230 Cal. App. 2d 375, 40 Cal. Rptr. 863(1964). The Shakespeare case is interesting because the cause of action arose after the
Muskopf decision and the enactment of the moratorium statute, but before the enact-
ment of the 1963 statutes. The court briefly discussed the concept that the plaintiff's
cause of action had been "suspended." For discussion on the Shakespeare case, illegal
arrests, and the 1963 Tort Claims Act, see Note, Civil Liability for Illegal Arrests and
Confinement in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 974 (1968).
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for trespass when he entered premises pursuant to a court order
issued to prevent waste.' °" Although the defendants were pro-
tected from false arrest liability because the arrest had been
made by a citizen,0 7 and there could be no action for malicious
prosecution under section 821.6,108 the court stated that there
may be a cause of action for false imprisonment due to failure
to release after delivery of bail.' °0 The court stated that the
early immunity of a municipality for false imprisonment was
not founded on a discretionary action theory, but on the sover-
eign immunity theory which had been eliminated by
Muskopf. '"0 Although the legislature had preserved the discre-
tionary act immunity it had not reinstated the general concept
of sovereign immunity.
The 1967 case of Watson v. County of Los Angeles"' dem-
onstrates an overextention of section 821.6 protection. In that
case a deputy court clerk failed to inform a judge that the
plaintiff had served his sentence."' Another clerk failed to keep
proper records of the plaintiff's election to serve a sentence in
lieu of paying a fine,"' causing an arrest warrant to be issued
after the plaintiff had already served his sentence."' The court
read the words in section 821.6, "instituting ... any judicial
. . .proceeding," very broadly and held the clerks immune
from liability under that section." 5
This holding was later disapproved in Sullivan v. County
of Los Angeles."' Such disapproval was partly based on the
criticism of California Law Revision Commission consultant,
Professor Van Alstyne, who stated that section 821.6 was to
protect law enforcement and other officials from interference
with their discretionary and quasi-judicial resonsibility of in-
stituting proceedings." 7 Professor Van Alstyne criticized the
Watson court for not attempting to explain how the clerk's
negligence in ministerial record keeping could "be transmuted
106. 230 Cal. App. 2d at 378, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
107. Id. at 382, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. See note 36 supra.
108. 230 Cal. App. 2d at 382-83, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
109. Id. at 383-84, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
110. Id. at 384-85, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
111. 254 Cal. App. 2d 361, 62 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1967).
112. Id. at 362, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 363, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
116. 12 Cal. 3d 710, 527 P.2d 865, 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1974).
117. Id. at 721-22, 527 P.2d at 872, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
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into the kind of discretionary determination ... the immunity
was designed to safeguard.""' 8
In the 1969 case of Vivell v. City of Belmont,"' plaintiff
brought an action against the city and a city councilman for
false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The
Belmont city councilman owned property adjacent to the
plaintiff's, and when the two disputed over sharing the cost of
a sewer line connection, a misdemeanor complaint was filed
against the plaintiff for violation of a city sewer ordinance. 2 '
A judgment of nonsuit in favor of the city was affirmed.'' The
city was found to have absolute immunity from liability for
malicious prosecution under previous case law and section
821.6.122 In considering the question of the councilman's indi-
vidual liability, the court noted that if he were acting within
the scope of his employment then he would be protected under
section 821.6, as was the city. If he was not acting within the
scope of his employment, he would not be entitled to the im-
munity, nor could he render the city liable. 3
In Bradford v. State' the dismissal of previous proceed-
ings under section 1203.4125 of the Penal Code was not entered
118. Id. quoting A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY
SUPPLEMENT § 5.63 (1969).
119. 274 Cal. App. 2d 38, 78 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1969).
120. Id. at 39, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
121. Id. at 40, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 843. San Francisco police, not Belmont employees,
were responsible for the arrest and brief imprisonment, consequently no cause of action
was stated against the defendant city on those counts.
122. Id. at 40, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
123. Id. at 41, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 843. In the following year the California Court of
Appeal for the First District considered an action for malicious prosecution which was
based on a theory of negligence. Johnson v. City of Pacifica, 4 Cal. App. 3d 82, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 246 (1970). The plaintiff attempted to avoid the effect of section 821.6, which
gives the public prosecutor immunity, by alleging that his investigators negligently
conducted their investigation of the plaintiff's alleged forgery. The plaintiff argued
that the investigators had a ministerial duty to conduct their investigation properly
and were not protected by the code immunity. The court held that the investigators
were indeed employees of a public entity protected by the statute. The dissent argued
that the court overlooked the fact that the complaint was for negligence and that the
Government Code section 821.6 was enacted for the purpose of protecting the discre-
tionary conduct of public employees, not nondiscretionary conduct amounting to negli-
gence.
124. 36 Cal. App. 3d 16, 111 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1973).
125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1975) provides that upon completion
and termination of probation the court shall dismiss the accusations or information
against the defendant and he shall thereafter be released from all disabilities resulting
from the offense. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11116 (West Supp. 1975) requires that such a
report of dismissal be furnished to the Department of Justice. Previously the report
was to be submitted to the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, but
this was changed by amendment in 1972.
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in the appropriate records and the plaintiff was arrested for
failure to register as a sex offender. The plaintiff brought an
action for wrongful arrest resulting from the negligent failure
to make an appropriate record. The state argued immunity
under Government Code section 815.2, on the basis of employee
immunity from the broad interpretation of section 821.6 ap-
plied in Watson.'2
The court of appeal found Government Code section 815.6
applicable.'" Section 815.6 renders a public entity liable for the
failure to perform mandatory duties, if the resulting injury is
of the kind that the duty was designed to prevent.' 2 The court
stated that while derivative liability may be nullified by em-
ployee immunity, direct liability could only be negatived by
statute.
1 2
The California Supreme Court narrowed the scope of sec-
tion 821.6 in the 1974 case of Sullivan v. County of Los
Angeles, 13 0 which was an action for false imprisonment result-
ing from confinement in the county jail beyond the proper
term. The County's motion for judgment on the pleadings was
granted on the basis of immunity under the Watson decision
and section 821.6.111 The supreme court reversed, holding that
the County was potentially directly liable under section 815.632
for failure to release plaintiff as mandated by Penal Code sec-
tion 1384,133 and potentially derivatively liable under sections
820, 820.4 and 815.2 of the Government Code.134 The court con-
fined the application of section 821.6 to malicious prosecution
actions,'35 specifically disapproving of the Watson decision and
other decisions which had relied on the broad Watson interpre-
tation of section 821.6.36 Although Sullivan concerned an ac-
126. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 20, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
127. Id. at 19-21, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
128. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1966).
129. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
130. 12 Cal. 3d 710, 527 P.2d 865, 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1974).
131. Id. at 715, 527 P.2d at 867, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
132. Id. at 722, 527 P.2d at 872, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
133. Id. at 716, 527 P.2d at 868, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 244. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1384
(West 1970), requires a defendant to be discharged from custody if the court dismisses
the action.
134. 12 Cal. 3d at 717, 722, 527 P.2d at 869, 872, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 245, 248.
135. Id. 720-21, 527 P.2d at 871, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
136. Id. at 722, 527 P.2d at 872, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 248. Also in 1974 the California
Court of Appeal for the Second District had stated that the immunity statute sections
821.6 and 815.2 "have been held to mean what they say," and that the restrictive
liability statutes do not violate the constitutional rights to due process and equal
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tion for false imprisonment, the general tone of the decision
was to restrict broad application of the statutes in an effort to
achieve just results. This was evidenced by its disapproval of
the Watson decision on the basis of Professor Van Alstyne's
criticism.37
The Collins court did not refer to the Sullivan holding, and
by following earlier case law seems to have missed an opportun-
ity to achieve more just results in a malicious prosecution situ-
ation by confining application of section 821.6 to the purpose
for which it was enacted-that is, to protect officials who make
discretionary decisions from harassing litigation, not to protect
a public entity from liability for the negligent acts or omissions
of its employees. The officer's re-filing of the second complaint
was clearly prohibited by statute and could not, therefore, be
termed a discretionary action.
Arguments Against the Rule of Immunity
The language of Learned Hand quoted in the Hardy case
is considered to be a succinct expression of the rationale behind
the immunity rule:
[t]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its
outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most reso-
lute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge
,of their duties .... As is so often the case, the answer must
be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either
alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest
officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to
the constant dread of retaliation. 138
The rule exists because the factors in favor of it outweigh
those against it, in the minds of the judiciary. The factors in
favor of the rule have already been expressed in this comment:
the protection of judicial and quasi-judicial officers in the per-
formance of their duty. But there are other considerations.
Professor Jaffe noted several factors which make up the
basis for the ministerial/discretionary act distinction and these
protection. Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. App. 3d 175, 177-78, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 622, 623 (1974).
137. See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
138. 48 Cal. 2d at 582-83, 311 P.2d at 496-97, quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 117 F.2d
at 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
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provide a background against which the malicious prosecution
rule can be examined.
These factors are the following: the character and severity
of the plaintiffs injury, the existence of alternative reme-
dies, the capacity of a court or jury to evaluate the pro-
priety of the officer's action, and the effect of liability
whether of the officer or of the treasury on effective admin-
istration of the law.'3 9
The second and fourth of these factors have already been met
or answered by the courts in California. The recent Collins case
quotes from White v. Towers on the issue of alternative reme-
dies and states that those who abuse their powers can be ousted
from office, or called to account criminally if their conduct
violates a penal law.'40 The fourth factor concerning effective
administration of the law is simply a restatement of the pre-
vious arguments.
It is the first and third of these factors which raise the most
important countervailing considerations to the rule of
immunity. They could briefly be labeled as "damages" and
"propriety."
In malicious prosecution actions the damages are usually
not large in amount, as is the case with false imprisonment
damages. Time spent in a cell or the loss of reputation does not
add up to much in many cases. Indeed, as Professor Jaffe
noted, the "breadth of official privilege has been made tolera-
ble only because in certain characteristic cases the plaintiff's
claim to damages is a marginal one."'"' In a malicious prosecu-
tion action the damages depend upon the character of the
plaintiff, and the jury has to place dollar values on out of
pocket loss, loss of reputation and humiliation.'42 This has led
to the suggestion that a liquidated damages provision for recov-
139. JAFFE, supra note 43, at 241. Professor Jaffe makes an introductory statement
concerning this area of the law which is most interesting.
Indeed it will be one of the theses of this chapter that, despite innumera-
ble statements to the contrary, the immunity is not in any reaslistic sense
a device to protect the officer, but rather that it expresses, even if only
subconsciously, the conclusion that the plaintiff should not recover at all.
Id. at 235. For further enumeration of factors supporting this subconcious conclusion,
see 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 489, 529 (1974).
140. Collins v. City & County of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 679, 123
Cal. Rptr. 525, 529 (1975).
141. JAFFE supra note 43, at 245.
142. See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955).
[Vol. 17
GO VERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ery would be more satisfactory, as it would tend to focus less
on the "moral worth" of the plaintiff.'43 Despite the amount of
damages involved, one who has been maliciously prosecuted
has suffered some damage, and to deny any remedy because
the action was instituted by a public official is to add insult to
injury.
This leads to the second argument for allowing recovery.
To tell a plaintiff that he must live with his damages because
in this case he "can't sue the government" does not say much
for the government's good faith towards the citizenry. The gov-
ernment should set an example by avoiding the label of law-
breaker."' This is the third factor mentioned by Professor Jaffe,
the "propriety" of the officer's or other public official's con-
duct, and the jury's capability of evaluating it. He believes that
the area of malicious prosecution is one where the finder of fact
"can be trusted to give the benefit of the doubt to those law
enforcement agencies whose zeal in fact deserves protection."'45
This seems to be a sound approach.
It should be noted that the California Law Revision Com-
mission made a study of governmental tort liability in connec-
tion with its recommendations for legislation at the time the
1963 statutes were adopted. In its study of the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity, the Commission noted the conflict between the
competing interests involved. On the one hand there is the
policy of not deterring public officials from doing their duty in
fear of litigation. On the other hand there is an interest in
protecting the innocent citizen from uncompensated injury.'
The Commission noted that "[o]fficial immunity, coupled
with sovereign immunity, results in almost a complete absence
of effective protection to the latter interest although admit-
tedly serving the former."'47 The Commission recommended
that the immunity from malicious prosecution liability enjoyed
143. Id. at 515. The author of this article raises some interesting points in the
area of false imprisonment damages, such as the fact that those in the lower end of
society are more vulnerable to illegal arrests; and if in fact a particular plaintiff has
suffered a prior conviction, it can be used to impeach his credibility as a witness, thus
making any recovery effort more difficult.
144. See Weissman, The Discriminatory Application of Penal Laws byState Ju-
dicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers: Playing the Shell Game of Rights and Remedies,
69 Nw. U.L. REV. 489, 498 (1974), quoting from the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
145. JAFFE supra note 43, at 255.
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by public employees be continued so they would not be subject
to harassment from "crank suits.""'4 However, the Commission
also stated that where public employees act maliciously in
using their official powers, the injured person should not be left
without a remedy.'49 The Commission stated that the employ-
ing public entity should be liable, with a right of idemnity
against the employee in cases where the employee acted with
actual malice.'5 Accordingly, the Commission had included in
its legislative recommendations a proposed section 816, which
read:
A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused
by an employee of the public entity if the employee, acting
within the scope of his employment, instituted or prose-
cuted a judicial or administrative proceeding without
probable cause and with actual malice.'
This section was not enacted by the Legislature, even
though the actual malice requirement would make recovery
more difficult than it would be in actions against private par-
ties.'52 But even if recovery would be difficult the fact that the
Law Revision Commission proposed such a section adds weight
to the argument that some recovery should be allowed in meri-
torious malicious prosecution suits brought against govern-
ment entities.
CONCLUSION
All of the concepts previously discussed-discretionary
acts, ministerial acts, direct liability, derivative liability, and
the general holding of the Muskopf case-should be re-
evaluated and formulated into a new rule of decision which
could continue to protect the interests of effective law enforce-
ment but also protect the rights of the individual.
A section similar to the section 816 proprosed by the Law
Revision Commission could be enacted, or the present section
821.6 could be strictly construed to protect officials exercising
discretionary functions, while giving an injured party a remedy




151. Id. at 841.




against the employing entity under a provision similar to sec-
tion 815.6. While the individual employee should be shielded
from liability, except in those cases where he abuses his posi-
tion and acts with actual malice, so as not to discourage him
from his duty, the employing entity should at least be liable for
some recompense to the mistakenly injured party. Private
employers can be liable for the acts of their employees, public
employers should also be liable for the acts of their employees
which lead to the kind of damages for which an action from
malicious prosecution would be the traditional remedy.
To counter the argument that greater liberality in this area
would "open the floodgates" to malicious prosecution cases,
effective preliminary claim procedures could be worked out,53
or perhaps a specialized view of the malice requirement could
be adopted with regard to public entity liability. In any case
punitive damages are not recoverable against a public entity,' 4
and a limitation to actual damages would probably prevent
recovery of large sums. Even a token recovery would at least
be some salve to the wounded dignity of an innocent victim
who has been imprisoned, no matter how briefly, because of a
bureaucrat's mistake.
Stephen R. Oliver
153. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-06 (West 1970) provides for a claim procedure
against the state to indemnify persons erroneously convicted and pardoned.
154. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818 (West 1966).
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